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The Application of International Human
Rights Law in State Courts: A View
From California*
PAUL

L.

HOFFMANt

I. Introduction
My remarks will focus on the use of international human rights law in
what I consider to be the manner most likely to be accepted by California's
judges; namely, to provide specific content to broad norms such as equal
protection or due process of law.' I believe that international human rights
law is most appropriately used in this context-both by the judge seeking
assistance in defining such broadly phrased constitutional norms and by the
litigator trying to convince a court to broaden the scope of human rights in
a given case.
My intent is to propose some answers to one of the most formidable questions that litigators intending to argue the applicability of human rights law
in a particular case must face; that is, what to reply when the law and
motion or trial judge asks, "Why should I apply international human rights
law, which I can't even Shepardize and which I have trouble finding, in a
lawsuit involving Californians and issues of California law?" I will also
suggest that it is worthwhile for litigators to force judges to ask this question
in appropriate cases.
The question is not an unreasonable one for a judge to ask. I have tried
to come up with some reasonable answers that are specific and that will
enable the litigators among you to stand in front of a judge, with some
degree of confidence, and make arguments that will be treated seriously
and, perhaps, even adopted by the court.
II. Preliminary Points
Before I get to those arguments I will make a few preliminary points.
First, while my talk focuses on the use of international human rights law by
*Edited transcript of a talk at the Symposium on The International Law of Human Rights
on April 9, 1983 at Southwestern University School of Law, Los Angeles.
tAssociate Professor, Southwestern University School of Law. B.A., 1972, C.C.N.Y.; M.Sc.,
1973, London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D., 1976, N.Y.U. Professor Hoffman is National Coordinator of the Amnesty International (U.S.A.) Legal Support Network.
'These remarks pertain directly to California Law; however, the independent vitality and
meaning of state constitutions is by no means limited to California. See generally Developments in the Law-The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324
(1982).
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litigators, it is a mistake to think that courts are the only place where international human rights law can be used, or that lawyers are the only people
who can use it profitably. It would be wrong to leave human rights only to
the lawyers. International human rights law should also be used by lobbyists and legislators, in the legislative process and by citizens in demanding
of their elected representatives laws which reflect the evolving body of
international human rights law.
Second, I do not believe that it is critical for practitioners to be overly
concerned about the precise legal status of the international norms they
present to a California court. When I use the phrase "international human
rights law" I am referring to more than the International Bill of Human
2
Rights (which is composed of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 4 and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights5 ).
I am also including a wide range of treaties, whether ratified or unratified
by the U.S., whether self-executing or non-self-executing, 6 whether or not
the norms they articulate are part of customary international law. For
instance, included in my definition are the Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners-rules which may or may not be part of custom7
ary law.
When using international human rights law to provide content to our
California law, the juridical status of the instruments used is not as important, nor are the complexities of application as great, as when the instruments are sought to be applied directly as binding law. A treaty ratified by
the U.S. may be more persuasive than an unratified treaty; a declaration
passed unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly decades ago, and regularly reaffirmed, may be more persuasive than a declaration recently passed
by the U.N. Economic and Social Council. A provision widely recognized
to be part of customary international law may be more persuasive than a
provision that is not. However, these differences are of degree rather than
kind when a court looks to international human rights norms as interpretive
aids.
The final preliminary point is that there is good reason to go through the
effort necessary to learn about international human rights law, which is
undeniably a complex and unfamiliar area of law to most practitioners and
2
3

G.A. Res 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
G.A. Res 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).

4G.A. Res 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
'G.A. Res 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
'See discussion of Connie de la Vega, infra. See also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
254 (1829); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
'First U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders Annex
l.A. at 67, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/6/1 (1955).
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even scholars. There are two questions to which the practitioner will want
answers before embarking on this course of study. One is, does this law
really help in a practical and strategic sense? That is, are there more and
broader rights described in international human rights law than in California law? The next question is, assuming that international human rights
law does create additional rights, is it worthwhile to use that law if it may
be used only as an interpretive device rather than as binding law?
III. The Value of Human Rights Law as an Interpretive Device
(A

In my view, having an interpretive device that the court actually uses is
almost as valuable as having law that the court says is binding on it. The
end result in many cases, for practical purposes, is the same. If a court uses
human rights law to reach a decision in your favor, it doesn't matter very
much what the legal status of the international norm is.
Another advantage of using human rights law as an interpretive device
rather than arguing that it is binding on the state court as treaty or customary law is that a California decision which adopts a human rights norm to
interpret California law cannot be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court; it
is insulated from Supreme Court review because there is an "independent
state ground" for the decision. If, however, a California court adopts international human rights law as a matter of treaty or customary law, then a
federal issue may be created. Litigators, particularly in California, may
wish to avoid that result, even to the point of using law that arguably has
treaty or customary law status merely for its interpretive value.
IV. Rights Recognized by International Law v. Rights Recognized by
California Law: Greater Protections?
Equal protection is one area where international human rights law may
be stronger than California law. Undeniably the California Supreme Court
has taken a much broader view of our equal protection clause (article 1,
section 7 of the California Constitution) than the U.S. Supreme Court has
taken of the equal protection clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 8 The Unruh Civil Rights Act 9 provides additional protection to
California residents. Despite California's good record, many equal protection arguments could be strengthened by use of international human rights
law to interpret California law, in particular the California Constitution
and the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
"Compare Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728 (1976) with San Antonio Ind. School District v.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See also Sail 'Er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1 (1971) (sex is a
suspect class) and Gay Law Students' Association v. Pacific Tel. and Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 458
(1979) (discrimination against homosexuals given a higher level of scrutiny than required
under federal law).
'CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (1974).
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Of all the norms in international human rights law, the norm against
discrimination is among the strongest. For example, article 2, section 2 of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides that:
The state parties to the present covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights
enunciated in the present covenant will be exercised without discrimination of
any kind as to race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.' 0
A significant feature of that section is that it prohibits discrimination based
on any status, not just the statuses recognized as suspect by the U.S. and'!
California Supreme Courts. Accordingly, litigators may be able to use
human rights law to make arguments for additional suspect classifications
or additional fundamental interests that have not yet been recognized as
such even by the California Supreme Court. For instance, the disabled
could be viewed as a suspect class, using international standards, in light of
the international human rights norms that have been articulated since the
mid-1970s, particularly in connection with the 1981 International Year of
the Disabled. "
Affirmative action is another area where the California Supreme Court
has gone beyond the U.S. courts.' 2 It is also an area where international
human rights law provides broader protections in that it may actually
require the taking of positive steps to eliminate discrimination under certain circumstances.' 3 Further, human rights law reaches government
actions that have discriminatory effects without requiring discriminatory
intent. '4
Human rights law can also play a role in the area of prisoners' rights. In
California, Penal Code sections 2600 and 2601 govern the rights of prisoners, both pre- and post-conviction. ' 5 Section 2600 provides that a prisoner's
rights may be limited only to the extent "necessary in order to provide for
the reasonable security of the institution in which he is confined and for the
protection of the public." For example, in March, 1983, Judge Hupp of the
Los Angeles Superior Court, in an ACLU case, Youngblood v. Gates, 16 held
that the De Lancie standards apply to treatment of pre-trial detainees in
L.A. city jails; he refused to follow the more restrictive standards articu'"See note 4, supra.
"See Report of the Advisory Com. for the Int'l Year of Disabled Persons (7 Oct. 1981) U.N.
Doc. No. A/36/471/Add. 1.
"See, e.g., Price v. Sacramento Civil Service Commission, 17 Cal. 3d 234 (1978).
"See, e.g., The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race Convention), 660 V.N.T.S. 195, opened for signature March 7, 1966,
entered into force January 4, 1969, art. 1(4), 2(l)(c)(d), 2(2) and 5.
"Id., art. 1(1).
"De Lancie v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 865 (1982).
"L.A.S.C. Nos. C203, 343 and C344, 693 (appeal pending).
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lated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish 17 and Rhodes v. Chapman. 18 The U.N.'s Standard Minimum Rules may be cited in such cases to
give content to Penal Code section 2600 just as they were cited by Justice
20
1 9 and by Judge Cabranes in Lareau v. Manson
Linde in Sterling v. Cupp
to assist in the interpretation of Oregon and Connecticut statutes,
respectively.
In short, there are several areas where international human rights law, at
least arguably, provides broader protections than California law. There are
always new battles to be fought and international human rights law may
profitably be pressed into service.
There also are other areas in which international law is not as good as
California law. For instance, the rights of criminal defendants under California law are as good or better than those recognized by international law.
In using international norms only to illuminate domestic standards, there is
no problem in such cases because in all cases the U.S. and state constitutions define minimum standards; international norms may be invoked only
in so far as they equal or surpass domestic standards.
V. Why Should a California Judge Invoke International
Human Rights Law?
Returning to my primary question, what to say to a skeptical law-andmotion or trial judge, I offer the following arguments. First, California has
been aboard the Paqueta Habana21 ever since it became a state. In other
words, since 1855, California courts have recognized that international law,
the law of nations, is part of California law and binding on California
judges, and is to be used where applicable to interpret the rights and obligations of litigants.22 California courts have continued to cite international
sources in a variety of cases. For instance, in People v.Anderson 23 the California Supreme Court referred to international documents and practices in
finding that the California death penalty statutes, as then written, offended
evolving standards of decency shared by civilized nations and therefore
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the California Constitution. Justice Newman cited international human rights law as additional
"441 U.S. 520 (1979).
'1452 U.S. 337 (1981).
29 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
20507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980), modified on different grounds, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.
1981).
" The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
"See Teschemacher v. Thompson, 18 Cal. 11 (1861). One cannot, of course, ignore the
obstacle posed by the California Supreme Court's decision in Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 713
(1952), in this account. However, Sei Fujii does not prevent a California court from looking to
international human rights law to assist in the interpretation of California law.
6 Cal. 3d 628 (1972).
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support for his positions in at least seven opinions. 24 This use of international law demonstrates that the issues and concepts of human rights law
are not unfamiliar to California courts.
Second, California courts have the authority to interpret the state constitution and laws of California independently of decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court and the actions of Congress or the federal executive. Article I, section 24 of the California Constitution sets forth plainly the
independent vitality of the California Constitution. Accordingly, California judges do not have to wait until the Senate decides to ratify a treaty or
until the federal judiciary recognizes an international norm as part of cus-'P
tomary law; they presently have full authority to invoke international
human rights norms in interpreting California law.
Third, the conception of human rights articulated by the California
Supreme Court is closer, in many respects, to the norms embodied in international human rights law than to the view of rights held by the present
U.S. Supreme Court. California courts routinely look to federal courts for
guidance in interpreting provisions of the California Constitution. Why
shouldn't they, in addition, look to international human rights law?
Fourth, I would point out that the U.S. has participated actively in the
creation of international human rights law over the last four decades, from
the U.N. Charter to the Universal Declaration, to the dozens of human
rights treaties, and to the even greater number of declarations and other
instruments that comprise the broad body of international human rights
law. A California judge, inclined to invoke human rights law, should not in
any way feel constrained by any notion that she or he is interfering with the
White House's assumption as to what international human rights law
should be. It is one thing to urge that the State Department, the executive
branch generally, or the Congress, out of deference to state autonomy,
should not impose obligations on state courts as a matter of binding treaty
law. It would be an altogether different and unreasonable position for the
federal government to object to a state court's decision to follow international human rights law on its own initiative. Neither federalism nor states'
rights are jeopardized by such initiative.
Fifth, state courts traditionally have been the courts that have fashioned
fundamental rights. Only during the period of the Warren court were U.S.
courts predominant in the creation of human rights standards. Interestingly, however, many of the Warren court decisions were preceded by deci2

People v. Levins, 22 Cal. 3d 620, 625 (1978) (conc. opinion); Cramer v. Tyars, 23 Cal. 3d
131 (1979) (dis. opinion); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130 n.2 (1980)
(Maj. opinion); People v. Privatera, 23 Cal. 3d 697 (1979); Conservatorship of Jofferber, 28
Cal. 3d 161, 172 n.9 (1980) (maj. opinion); People v. Mimirani, 30 Cal. 3d 375, 388 n.I, (1981);
American National Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm., 32 Cal. 3d 603, 608 nn.4,
5 (1982) (maj. opinion).
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sions of state courts, notably the California Supreme Court, that paved the
way for the federal decisions. There is absolutely no reason why California
should not similarly lead the way in the use of international human rights
law.
Sixth and finally, California courts are agents of the developing international legal order. Undoubtedly there is a way of phrasing this argument
that does not appear to accuse a judge of subversive activities in furtherance
of an international plan of which she or he is wholly unaware. One way or
another, I do believe that state judges can be convinced that it is appropriate for them to play a role in the implementation of international human
rights law. The international legal system is not structured like our own
system; there is no supreme tribunal to interpret and apply international
human rights law. All courts, including state courts, are competent to interpret international human rights law and each state court proceeding in
which human rights law is used, even as an interpretive device, contributes
to the growth and strengthening of human rights norms.
Customary international law has been held to be part of our common
law 25 and is similarly regarded by courts in most nations that have a common law tradition. International norms, whether regarding human rights
or any other subject of international law, may ripen into customary law in
part by being used and cited by courts. All courts-appellate and trial,
federal and state, national and international-are competent to participate
in the evolution of international human rights law. To the extent they do
so, courts may contribute to the growing respect paid to international
human rights norms in our own country and, through our example, around
the world.
The international documents embodying human rights law, like our federal and state constitutions, are grand and potentially powerful instruments
in the hands of those with the courage, knowledge and willingness to use
them. That is the task that faces us. We will prevail only if we begin to
appeal to judges to share that vision.

2
The Paquele Habana, supra n.20, 197 U.S. at 700; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(1980); See also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 221-23 (1972).
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